Chaos · 151

Binance claims $473 million, will RedotPay's IPO path be blocked?

Author: Asher_ 0210 Original title: Claimed by Binance for $473 million, can U-card leader RedotPay successfully go public? RedotPay, the leader of crypto payment cards (U cards), has been sued in court by its former partner Binance. Last night, according to Bloomberg, various Binance related entities sued the three RedotPay co-founders Gao Zhangpeng, Chan Wa Choi, and Yao Chao, alleging that the three violated the agreement, directed more than 470,000 Binance Card users to RedotPay, and claimed $472.8 million. Binance said that since the two parties cooperated, RedotPay has received about US$304 million in user funds through Binance Pay, but the relevant funds were not isolated as agreed, and some of the funds were eventually used to recharge the RedotPay Card. RedotPay later responded that the lawsuit will not affect the company's current or future day-to-day operations, and will actively defend all charges. Since the case has already entered judicial proceedings, the company will not comment further on the specific dispute. In order to give readers who are not familiar with the U card sector a general idea of who is being sued by Binance, RedotPay currently occupies half of the crypto payment card market and is impacting the $4 billion valuation. Taking the lead in crypto U-cards, RedotPay is already preparing to go public in the US. RedotPay was founded in April 2023 and mainly provides stablecoin payment cards, multi-currency wallets, fiat currency exchange, and global transfer services. After users deposit stablecoins such as USDT and USDC into RedotPay, they can complete online subscriptions, offline purchases, and cross-border payments through virtual or physical cards. At present, the company has more than 8 million users, annual payments of 14 billion US dollars, and annualized revenue of about 180 million US dollars. Since 2024, RedotPay has been at the top of the crypto U-card market. According to Paymentscan data, in July of this year, the total transaction volume of the crypto U-card circuit was about US$749 million, with RedotPay trading volume reaching US$395 million, accounting for 52.8%, leading the fault; Ether.fi trading volume of US$100 million, accounting for 13.4%, ranking second; and KAST trading volume of US$89.6 million, accounting for 11.9%, ranking third. Last year, RedotPay closed three rounds of financing, totaling $194 million: In March, RedotPay closed a $40 million Series A round led by Lightspeed. At the time, the company had more than 3 million users; in September, RedotPay completed strategic financing of 47 million dollars, led by Coinbase Ventures, the valuation exceeded 1 billion US dollars and the number of users increased to more than 5 million; in December, RedotPay completed Series B financing of 107 million US dollars, led by Goodwater Capital, Pantera Capital, Blockchain Capital, Institutions such as Circle Ventures and HSG participated. After becoming a crypto U-card unicorn, RedotPay began preparations to go public in the US. The company plans to conduct an IPO in New York as early as this year. The potential funding scale is over 1 billion US dollars, the target valuation is over 4 billion US dollars, and it is also currently negotiating a new round of financing of up to 150 million US dollars. RedotPay's early growth comes from Binance Pay In November 2023, RedotPay partnered with Binance to access Binance Pay. Users can directly deposit funds from their Binance account to their RedotPay Card through a mini program within the Binance app (officially announced publicly on December 15). Binance Pay is a crypto payment tool launched by Binance. Users can directly use the assets in their Binance account to complete transfers and payments; Binance Card is an encrypted U card introduced by Binance for everyday consumption scenarios, and RedoTP...

16d agoburnking#PayFi #Binance

Bloomberg: Binance Sues RedotPay for $472.8 Million Claims, Accusing it of Diverting Illegal Users

According to Bloomberg, Binance related entities Nest Trading, DistributedTechnologies, and Chaintecs Consulting Singapore have filed lawsuits against RedotPay co-founders Gao Zhangpeng, Chan Wa Choi, and Yao Chao in Hong Kong, accusing the three of violating the agreement and diverting more than 470,000 users from Binance Card to RedotPay claims losses of $472.8 million. Binance said it was discovered that RedotPay has been allowing Binance Pay funds to be used to recharge RedotPay cards without being quarantined since March 2026, and that the partnership has enabled RedotPay to receive approximately $304 million in user funds from Binance Pay. RedotPay responded that it will actively defend all allegations without affecting the company's day-to-day operations. Additionally, Binance's affiliate Chaintecs has also filed a lawsuit against RedotPay affiliates in Singapore, and a hearing is scheduled to be held on Friday. RedotPay previously sought an IPO valued at around $4 billion. The company said it currently has an annualized payment volume of $14 billion, annual revenue of $180 million, and more than 8 million users. This article is sponsored by GENG, Build Your Fortune on GENG (https://geng.one)

17d agoburnking

Strategist: High expectations led to a pullback in Asian tech stocks, and the industry's inflection point has not arrived

Comparing news, David Chao, a global market strategist at Invesco Asia Pacific, said that Asian technology stocks had a bad start to the week. Previously, the revenue of a major US semiconductor company fell short of expectations and did not raise AI business guidelines, which triggered a sell-off in US stocks. Asian tech stocks are directly linked to the US semiconductor cycle because they share the same supply chain and investor positions. However, the strategist said he doesn't think a company's quarterly earnings report predicts upcoming industry trends. This is simply because the market's expectations that AI guidelines will continue to rise have become too high. In Asia, the AI investment narrative has become quite concentrated, mostly driven by a few companies in South Korea and Taiwan. These concentration risks make the market much more vulnerable. As a result, when a company's performance is disappointing, or demand or supply is disrupted, one sees extraordinary market fluctuations.

75d ago

ZachXBT rewards $10,000 to solicit evidence of market manipulation by Hong Kong market maker HSBG

Comparing the news, on-chain detective ZachXBT said that its positive reward is up to 10,000 US dollars to solicit insider information related to the Hong Kong market maker “Heisenberg Guru (HSBG).” ZachXBT alleges that HSBG is involved in multiple centralized exchange (CEX) market manipulation incidents including $RIVER. It pointed out that Sion and Chao are core members of HSBG, and stated that materials such as chat records, contracts, and internal communications may all be rewarded. The way to submit leads is to contact ZachXBT via X private message.

96d ago

Chaos Labs: Oracle Network Remains Secure After Suspected 'National' Wallet Attack

Comparatively, according to Cointelegraph, crypto risk management and infrastructure provider Chaos Labs said its oracle network was attacked by suspected “national” hackers last weekend, but it was not breached. Chaos Labs founder Omer Goldberg said on the X platform that the scope of the attack was strictly limited to operational wallets used for daily on-chain operations, and that the oracle network had never been hacked. The oracles operate in a completely isolated environment, with nodes distributed around the world and protected by multiple layers of security and cryptographic controls. Chaos Labs has rotated all keys since the attack was attempted and no further suspicious activity has been detected.

106d ago

Kelp-Aave crisis: 290 million losses, who pays for it?

Source: Blockworks Research Author: shaunda devens Compiled and compiled: bitPushNewsHelp deployed its LayerZero cross-chain bridge, using a “1-of-1” decentralized validator network (DVN) setup, which means that only one verification node is required to verify cross-chain transactions. An attacker managed to hack into the private key of this independent node and forged a cross-chain message claiming that RsETH has been destroyed on the L2 network. Since only one signature was required, the cross-chain bridge accepted forged instructions and directly minted 116,500 unsecured RSetH worth approximately $292 million into the attackers' wallets on the Ethereum mainnet. Instead of immediately selling these unsecured tokens on decentralized exchanges (as this would crush the spot price), the attackers used them to attack using Aave's lending mechanism. At the time, Aave V3 allowed users to borrow WETH as collateral under the E-Mode (Efficient Mode) framework, with a loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of up to 93%. The attackers deposited these questionable RSetH collateral into Aave and borrowed huge amounts of WETH, ultimately leaving Aave with a bad debt of around $196 million. As exploits and bad debt news spread, users poured in to withdraw assets and withdrew more than $8 billion from the agreement within 24 hours, causing Aave's WETH utilization rate to soar to 100%, effectively freezing the remaining depositors' liquidity. Before we dive deeper into recovery plans, I think this is an excellent case showing the risks associated with Aave looping strategies (looping strategies) driven by risk teams. As a reference, we've previously outlined the strategy of revolving through USdE and how it can achieve almost “risk-free” (as opposed to holding the underlying asset without revolving) returns. The process is as follows: Revolving borrowers (Loopers) deposit high-yield assets (such as RsETH) into Aave. Revolving borrowers use E-Mode to borrow related assets (ETH) using RsETH as collateral and earn the interest difference between staked income plus points and borrowing costs. However, the risk assumption stems from Aave's lenders, as their ETH was loaned out of the agreement and used by the borrowers to accumulate more rSetH (or whatever related asset they were borrowing). In this way, Aave's depositors actually became the third tier of the strategy (the first tier is a revolving borrower, the second tier is Umbrella, and the third tier is Aave's lender because their ETH has already been loaned). In return, ETH depositors received slightly higher interest rates as demand for ETH increased utilization of ETH reserves and increased borrowing costs. However, large reserves of ETH are at risk. This is exactly what happened here: ETH depositors were harmed, and although they had no direct exposure to RsETH, their ETH was an asset that was loaned against RsETH collateral and flowed back into circulation. This is the core risk embedded in Aave's pool model. Although modular lending is often criticized for contributing to high leverage and potentially unsafe strategies, this is actually one area where modularization provides better solutions because lenders can choose the type of collateral they are willing to finance and demand compensation accordingly. That's why Aave supports revolving borrowing far more than Morpho. On Morpho, lenders often require substantially higher annualized returns (APR) to fund these deals, which naturally limits their size. By contrast, on Aave, the risk framework is set centrally by curators (curators), so all ETH providers are actually forced to participate in funding the strategy, regardless of whether they actively choose this exposure or not. Blockworks Advisory's Silvio Busonero suggests two possible outcomes: 1) The actual value of Kelp DAO allocates losses rsETH is currently around 18% lower than ETH. Currently 17% of ETH on Aave...

124d agoWendy#Aave #Kelp #LayerZero #compiling #Hacking incident

Aave's current situation revealed: the business is hard core, but the valuation is being weighed down by the “big deal disease”

Author: 137 Labs Original title: Aave's true situation: The business is still strong, but the “big deal disease” has become a valuation ceiling introduction If you only look at the volume on the chain, Aave is still one of the most dominant agreements on the DeFi lending circuit. According to the statement given by Token Terminal in its March 2026 report, Aave's TVL for the month was US$42.34 billion, with an active loan balance of US$16.55 billion, maintaining a 59.79% share of the DeFi lending market. The DeFiLama page shows that Aave currently lends about US$17.796 billion, revenue from the 30-day agreement is about US$6.1 million, and revenue from annualized agreements is about US$74.39 million. This shows that no matter which platform's statistical caliber is used, Aave is still the industry's core on-chain credit infrastructure. But if you look one level further, you'll find that the focus of the market debate has changed. In the past, Aave's core narrative was “scale growth, cross-chain expansion, stablecoin GHO promotion, and institutional business layout”; now, what actually makes the market reprice it is a set of lower level questions: whether repurchases and capital allocation are efficient, whether governance and execution are unbalanced, whether risk control capabilities are sustainable even after the loss of core contributors, and whether agreement revenue can be steadily converted into token value. The withdrawal of Chaos Labs, the gradual departure of BGD Labs, and the withdrawal of ACI from governance discussions caused these originally only structural conflicts within the community to be exposed to a wider market perspective. Seen from this perspective, Aave is not facing the problem of “not doing business”, but rather the problem of “how to continue to operate in a more mature corporate, fiscal, and institutionalized manner with an agreement that is already large”. Because of this, Aave is currently more like a mid-stage financial institution: the asset size and brand are already very large, but capital allocation, organizational governance, and risk control responsibilities are beginning to become key variables in determining the upper valuation limit. Data layer: Aave is still strong, but the growth logic has changed. From a data perspective, Aave has not experienced a “business collapse.” On the contrary, the problem is that its data is still strong, so structural issues are more worth being wary of. According to Token Terminal's March 2026 report, Aave's March TVL was US$42.34 billion, up 45.45% year on year; active loan balance was US$16.55 billion, up 47.32% year on year; despite experiencing a monthly decline from February to March, both core indicators were significantly higher than the same period last year. At the same time, the report pointed out that the March fee revenue was $43.94 million, and the agreement revenue was 6.64 million US dollars, indicating that Aave still has a very strong ability to generate cash flow. If you take these numbers apart, Aave's data has a few very notable characteristics. First, it is not an agreement that “relies on idling TVL to support valuation”. An active loan of $16.55 billion in March, corresponding to a TVL of $42.34 billion, means that active loans/TVL is around 39%. This ratio is not low, indicating that the assets deposited into Aave are not just passively suspended, but are continuously transformed into real borrowing demand. As far as loan agreements are concerned, looking at TVL alone does not explain the problem; what really reflects capital efficiency is “how much loan balance, how much interest income, and how much agreement income can TVL convert.” In all three dimensions, Aave is still one of the strongest in the industry. Second, Aave's revenue structure is shifting from a “single loan spread” to “diversified credit platform revenue.” According to the March report, GHO has been growing for three consecutive months, with a market capitalization exceeding US$514.5 million and contributing 10.65% of March agreement revenue. This means that Aave is no longer just an agreement that relies on fluctuations in market borrowing demand, but is trying to keep part of the value created by credit within its own system through its own stablecoins. For loan agreements, the significance of the stablecoin business is not only to add revenue, but also to increase revenue stickiness. Fees and revenue from pure loan agreements are often highly pro-cyclical. During a bull market, interest rates are high, borrowing is strong, and income expands; during a bear market, demand falls, interest rates are compressed, and revenue falls. However, once stablecoins form a network effect of minting, circulation, settlement, and collateral, the revenue curve is usually smoother than a simple lending business. The increase in GHO's share of revenue means that Aave is trying to reduce its “pure leveraged demand drive” cyclicality. Third, Aave's growth has moved from an “explosive expansion” to a “stock leader...

135d agoLuxurytracy

Is the US-Iran cease-fire because Trump wants to host a TRUMP coin dinner? CZ's new book became an Amazon bestseller...

Dear readers, what have the KOLs in the crypto industry been talking about in the past 24 hours? Note: The following content is compiled from the X platform. They are all personal opinions. They do not represent the platform's position, let alone constitute investment advice. Is the US-Iran cease-fire because Trump wants to organize a TRUMP coin dinner? CZ's new book became Amazon's best-selling product... Chaos Labs, Aave's leading risk management agency, announced its exit; is DeFi really that bad? This article is sponsored by GENG, Build Your Fortune on GENG (https://geng.one)Twitter：https://twitter.com/BitpushNewsCN比推 TG Community: https://t.me/BitPushCommunity比推 TG Subscription: https://t.me/bitpush

136d agoWendy

The line of defense that the crypto market has never built

Author: Omer Goldberg, founder of Chaos Labs Original title: The Market Crypto Never Built Compiled and edited: bitPushNews I founded Chaos because I believe in two things: the future of finance is on the chain. In that future, no version allows on-chain systems to be less secure than the systems they replace. Five years later, these two points are still true. Chaos worked with partners such as Aave, Ethena, Kraken, PayPal, LayerZero, Jupiter, and GMX to achieve this vision, processing trillions of dollars in cumulative transaction volume and achieving zero bad debts. Every security incident follows the same script, but five years of deep cultivation in this field also means being able to observe everything that continues to go wrong up close. Every exploit (exploit) follows the same script. Some links broke down, millions of dollars disappeared, and the crypto Twitter (Crypto Twitter) community was furious. Everyone agreed this sucks! But then a few weeks passed, and we moved on to the next farce. As attention dissipated, nothing substantial changed. The temptation is that people tend to zoom in (Zoom in) to a single team, a single vulnerability, or a single missed check item. Sometimes this kind of analysis is really important; I've written many similar articles. But after observing the same cycle for years, the pattern is clear. These are not isolated failures. Our industry structure was built to produce these results. Motivational Charlie Munger once said, “Tell me the motivational mechanism and I can tell you the results.” In traditional finance and Web2 security, risk management becomes a**non-discretionary (mandatory) ** once you touch customer funds or critical systems. There are standards, audits, procurement requirements, insurance companies, and regulators. None of them are perfect, but collectively they form the bottom line. Cryptocurrency never built that layer. So, yes, cryptocurrencies have a security issue. However, this safety issue is a downstream product; upstream is a larger market incentive issue. Without that structure, growth looks like progress, and risk looks like cost. Rational decisions are not the same thing as good decisions, and they won't be the same thing until incentives change. How is the market established for a cloud security company with an annual revenue (ARR) of $5 million and rapid growth in the right niche? Buyers and investors will compete for it at a revenue valuation of 20 times. Google bought Wiz at a cost of $32 billion, with a projected revenue estimate of more than 30 times. These valuations didn't come out of thin air. They exist because buyers already exist; buyers exist because regulation created them. If you process payment data, PCI DSS will tell you what your responsibilities are. If you're a publicly traded company, SEC (US Securities and Exchange Commission) rules require you to disclose major cybersecurity incidents. Once this accountability mechanism is defined, budgets, procurement processes, and industry categories follow. Geniuses who could have developed games, social apps, or B2B software choose to build secure products because of the financial rewards. Accountability creates demand, and demand attracts talent, and talent is the core of truly making the system more secure. An efficient marketplace will attract the people most needed by the industry. The proof is that someone in the compliance stack will say, “But cryptocurrencies do have big security companies. What about Chainalysis and TRM?” That just proved my point. Check out why these businesses exist: If you're a US money services business (and most crypto companies are), you must comply with the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), OFAC sanctions screening, and FinCEN's anti-money laundering requirements. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has fined OKX more than $500 million for anti-money laundering failures. Bittrex paid $29 million for allowing users to evade sanctions in Syria, Iran, and Cuba. And this enforcement is getting stronger, not weaker. The GENIUS Act included payment stablecoins in the BSA category, and FinCEN's new reporting framework means that every former employee is now financially motivated to report compliance flaws. Companies don't buy just one compliance solution. They'll buy two or three because when the Department of Justice or...

137d agoWendy#Aave #AI #Chaos #Ethena #GMX #Jupiter #Kraken #LayerZero #Paypal #transactions #crypto market #depths #spurring #viewpoints #hacks

Opinion: The exchange's AAVE reserves have increased to 2.23 million, and prices may continue to be under pressure

Comparing news, CryptoQuant platform author Darkfost posted on X platform that Aave fell below $100 in March. There was a disagreement within the agreement, and core contributors such as BGD Labs and Chaos Labs left. Since the beginning of February, the exchange's AAVE reserves have increased from 2.07 million to 2.23 million, of which Binance holds 1.63 million. Binance reserves increased from 1.57 million to 1.63 million during the same period. Aave exchange reserves have now risen above the 90-day moving average, ending the downward trend in reserves since April 2025. This situation indicates that more AAVE tokens are currently being sent to exchanges, which may bring more selling pressure in the short term.

137d ago