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The founder responded three times. Why is the Gate coin theft case getting more and more dark?

The founder responded three times. Why is the Gate coin theft case getting more and more dark?

Author: Maher, Foresight News Original title: The founder responded several times, why didn't Gate's “PR” community buy it? On August 3, Gate's official Chinese-language Twitter account posted a screenshot of an external database query after coding to try to prove that user @jheioff's personal information had already been seriously leaked from outside the platform, rather than causing security issues due to its own reasons. However, some users in the comments section responded that user privacy was unboxed by Gate, and the impression was too poor. This move quickly escalated the dispute over account security and accountability into a privacy and PR crisis, and became the latest tipping point after the incident continued for nearly a month. This case, which began on July 8, has evolved into a typical centralized exchange trust storm. Users claim that about $1.7 million worth of assets have been stolen, while Gate insists that there are no systemic security breaches. The evidence chains between the two sides are in sharp conflict, and the community continues to raise questions. From breaking the news to the confrontation, the two sides held each other's arguments. On July 8, X user @jheioff publicly posted that he hadn't logged in to his Gate account for a few days, and when he checked again, he found that about $1.7 million in assets had been emptied. This includes 49.96 ETH, 746,475 HSK, and 1565,982 USDT. The user stressed that the account has enabled mobile verification, Google Authenticator, and email verification. The phone did not receive any verification codes during this period, and he never provided a video, handheld ID, or login screen recording. Foresight News previously wrote in “1.7 Million Gate Users Stolen, Has Face Recognition Been Hacked?” The cause and circumstances of the incident are described in detail in the article. One day after the incident unraveled, Gate had a net outflow of about $200 million, according to DeFilLama data. On July 11, in an announcement, Gate apologized for the initial communication attitude, admitting that it “did not put users' feelings first”, and expressed understanding of users' anxiety and acceptance of criticism. At the same time, it continued to assist the police and provide legal resource support, but insisted that there were no platform security risks. Around July 17, the stolen user officially filed a case with the public security authorities. Since then, the two sides have blamed each other over the submission of evidence and the degree of lawyers' involvement and cooperation. The stolen user claimed that Gate repeatedly requested the format of judicial investigation materials, identity verification, etc., causing delays. Gate, on the other hand, said that users have repeatedly refused the intervention of the lawyers' team, focusing on putting pressure on public opinion rather than tracking down hackers, so they decided to directly arrange for lawyers to cooperate with the police. The core controversy, however, is whether authentication and manual review actually fail. The stolen user insisted that the mobile phone verification, Google Authenticator, and email address originally tied to the account were not leaked, that he had never submitted a handheld ID video or live experience, and that the device model did not match Gate's back-office records. Users disclosed surveillance videos in an attempt to prove that they had not operated some of the alleged face recognition periods. The user questioned Gate, saying that the attackers were able to completely reset security items and withdraw 1.7 million US dollars using only forged handheld ID data, live video of someone other than their own, and an inactive Alipay account with no strong binding relationship with Gate. This in itself indicates a problem with the platform's review chain. Gate, on the other hand, presents a completely different chain of evidence. The platform emphasizes that the materials submitted by the applicant are highly consistent, including real-name information, transaction flow, and recordings of key Alipay historical transactions. The Gate technical team believes that Alipay has extremely strict real-time risk control. Changing the device to log in will force multiple verifications. This screen recording can only be recorded by yourself or someone who can access the Alipay account. Combined with multiple notifications and withdrawal delay protection windows within 4 days, Gate concluded that the attackers had deep control over users' external information and device permissions. This was the result of serious information leaks or device control on the user side, rather than a systemic vulnerability in the platform. On August 3, Gate posted a screenshot of a third-party data breach database query, saying that it had obtained evidence of serious external leaks from users (including IMEI), and the lawyer would hand it over directly to the police. After community users responded “out of the box,” Gate clarified that the entire screenshot was coded to prove that it was not an internal leak. Subsequent sensitive materials were only submitted through formal judicial channels. On the same day, Han Lin, founder of Gate, wrote that lawyers have stepped in throughout the process and resolutely cooperated with the police. As long as the government determines that Gate is responsible, double compensation will never be avoided, and 3.4 million US dollars will be linked to the chain...

18d agoburnking
Crypto Agent commercialization is accelerating, why are stablecoins the most critical part?

Crypto Agent commercialization is accelerating, why are stablecoins the most critical part?

Core view: For AI agents to become real economic agents, the core obstacle is that traditional payment systems cannot support their autonomous payments. Stablecoins represented by USDC, along with dedicated infrastructure launched by companies such as Coinbase, Circle, and Stripe, are building a native programmable, all-weather, small, high-frequency “currency layer” for AI agents, spawning a program-driven on-chain microeconomy. Key elements: 1. Four major barriers to traditional payments: Agents cannot pass the identity barrier (no ID card), authorization (verification code required), time (not 7 x 24 hours), and cost (high fixed processing fee), and cannot perform small-amount high-frequency transactions. 2. Native advantages of stablecoins: programmable (automatic code execution), no license (self-generated wallet), 7 x 24 hours, transparent accounts and stable value, perfect for agent payment needs. 3. Implementation practices of leading companies: Coinbase launched AgentKit and X402 protocols (more than 50 million transactions have been processed); Circle launched the CCTP cross-chain protocol and AgentStack; Stripe launched a stablecoin API and supported USDC subscription payments. 4. Typical application scenario 1 (ultra-small payment): The x402 protocol and Circle's Gateway Nanopayments achieve $0.000001 micropayments, unlocking the long-term economy of pay-per-use billing for API calls, data access, etc. 5. Typical application scenario 2 (automatic generation): AI agents can achieve “self-hematopoiesis” through yield-bearing stablecoins (such as aUSDC), cover operating costs with interest, and platforms such as Ymax can achieve 8-12% annual stablecoin returns. 6. Large-scale implementation challenges: Private key management is vulnerable to attacks (such as the Owockibot incident), gaps in compliance (agents cannot be identified), and inaccurate AI intentions may lead to irreversible financial losses. Generative AI is changing from a “chatbot” to an AI agent (AI agent) that can do things by itself. A real question then popped up: How do these silicon-based “employees” receive money and how do they pay? Traditional banking stuff — real-name authentication, manual authorization, public accounts — inherently disapproves of AI agents. One answer that is rapidly evolving is to use stablecoins (USDC, USDT, and stablecoins with interest) to create a native “currency layer” for AI. This article will break down the implementation of leading companies such as Coinbase, Circle, and Stripe in this field, while also discussing compliance and security risks. The technical infrastructure is ready, but how to drive it is still a big problem. 1. The “payment breakpoint” encountered in the commercialization of AI agents Today's AI agents are already very capable: book air tickets, write codes, adjust interfaces... but they get stuck as soon as they get to the “payment” step. Traditional payment systems are designed for humans — you have to have an ID card, enter a verification code, operate on weekdays, and have a low processing fee for each transaction. These are all barriers for agents. Specifically, traditional payment systems set up four hurdles for agents: identity barriers: opening a bank account or credit card requires an ID card, face recognition, or even bank transactions, and agents can't even pull it out. Authorization: SMS verification codes, manual confirmation, and 3D security authentication are often required during payment, and agents cannot click buttons even if they cannot receive SMS. Time limit: Banks only process transfers on weekdays and business hours, while agents work 7×24 hours. Cost barrier: Each transaction has a fixed processing fee, such as starting at 30 cents for credit cards, so the pay-per-use model of $0.001 doesn't work at all. However, the financial behavior of agents requires exactly this kind of small, high-frequency charge (such as per number of API calls, per usage). The more fundamental problem is that the entire payment system has never considered direct “program to program” transfers. Even between two technology companies, the process is often: the agent generates an order → sends an email → person approves → person logs in to online banking to transfer money → each other's financial reconciliation. The agent can only do the first two steps and the final record. The most important step, “money from A to B”, must be done by hand. Current experiments: they are all modelling...

18d ago22#AI #stablecoins #wallets
Gate Owner Stole $1.7 Million: Who's Lying?

Gate Owner Stole $1.7 Million: Who's Lying?

The hottest topic of discussion in the crypto community over the past few days is the “theft case” of Gate users worth 1.7 million dollars. On July 8, an X ID user called “The First Beautiful Girl” (@jheioff) tweeted that the money in her Gate account was gone — 49.96 ETH, more than 740,000 HSK, and more than 1.56 million USDT, which added up to about 1.7 million US dollars. However, TA said that he hadn't received any verification codes from beginning to end, nor had face recognition, so the money just disappeared. Gate.io officially confirmed that the withdrawal actually occurred, but the statement given was completely different: the platform said that all operations had been fully verified, including face recognition, email verification codes, and fund passwords, and not a single step away. Both sides have thrown out a bunch of evidence, and both seem to have their share of it. There is no third party's conclusion on this matter until now, but all kinds of doubts and speculations have exploded. Let's take a quick look at the timeline of both parties. You'll find that the strangest part of this incident is that the details of the stories told by both sides are very specific, but there's just something wrong. Gate officially issued a detailed explanation on July 8, sorting out the entire process according to the timeline: on July 4, a new device initiated a request to reset the phone and email address. Gate requires live face verification, SMS verification code, and original email verification code. The reset was completed after all were passed. On July 5, the account party requested that the phone be untied. The customer service once again confirmed the face activity experience, and also requested the other party to provide a recording of the 2019 historical transaction (Alipay payment record) before unbinding. On July 6, the Google Authenticator was reset, and the login password and fund password were also changed—the email verification code and original fund password were verified at every step. On July 7, an old historical device (Mac web) logged in with the old passkey and then initiated a withdrawal to a new address. Gate asked again for a live face, Google verification code, and financial password, all of which passed. This address was then set as a “free verification address”, and 5 withdrawals were completed. On July 8, users only contacted customer service for the first time and said “funds have been lost”. Gate's conclusion is that this is not a system bug or platform security issue. All operations are traceable, are individual cases, and may be related to the user's own information disclosure. The victim's version is completely different: TA said he didn't actively reset or withdraw any security items from beginning to end. Gate claimed that the user used an iPhone to complete live face verification, but TA directly threw out a video of the home surveillance — in the picture, @jheioff was playing in the living room while holding the child, and hadn't touched the phone at all, let alone do any face recognition. @jheioff emphasized that this video can be submitted to the police and the judiciary for verification. Users claim that they don't have an iPhone 14 at all (the device mentioned in Gate records), and they haven't received any relevant notification emails or abnormal verification code alerts. Everything is fine with accounts on other exchanges; only Gate has problems. With the second round of clashes between the two sides, more details were shaken out, but it made things even more confusing. Gate further revealed that the IP for face recognition on July 4 was 42.200.39.1XX, and the device was an iPhone 14. The live test results were “low risk of inactivity” and “highly consistent” with the face on the KYC file. At around 3 a.m. on July 5, the account side also submitted a video showing the documents and handwritten documents for unbinding verification. At 9:26 p.m. on the same day, the 2019 Alipay recording was also submitted. Gate said that it had cross-checked with his transaction records and was accurate to the payment amount “22:28 on October 9, 2019.” The victims denied all of this: they used an iPhone 16 Pro, the old device was an iPhone 13, and there was no iPhone 14 at all; they went to bed at 3 a.m., and couldn't submit any videos; they didn't know the 2019 Alipay recording screen at all. However, TA acknowledged one detail — the Mac web login on July 7 is probably actually my own browser, because I am used to keeping the exchange page permanently in the browser. However, TA emphasized that the login was performed by the person himself, which does not mean that the latter operations were also performed by himself. What is the most likely cause? Right now, the community is most focused on three possibilities. The first is that AI face-swapping has bypassed face recognition. This isn't a sci-fi plot anymore. Deepfake technology in 2026 is very mature. As long as you have KYC photos or even a public video of the other party, you can generate enough...

43d agoWendy#AI #Gate #Exchanges #original #security #hacks
1.7 million Gate users have been stolen. Has face recognition been hacked?

1.7 million Gate users have been stolen. Has face recognition been hacked?

Author: Sanqing, Foresight News On July 8, Gate Exchange user “First Beautiful Girl (@jheioff)” posted on the X platform that her Gate Exchange account had been stolen and that approximately $1.7 million of assets had been shorted. Gate's official Chinese-language account later confirmed that the account completed a total of 5 withdrawals on July 7, totaling 49.96 ETH, 746,475 HSK, and 1,565,982 USDT, equivalent to about 1.7 million US dollars. The user said that the account has enabled mobile verification, Google Authenticator, and email verification, but the phone did not receive any verification codes throughout the process, and he himself never provided a video, handheld ID, or login screen recording. Gate's Chinese-language official later released a full timeline response, listing every step of the account's operations from July 4 to 7, including live face verification, SMS and email verification codes, and fund password changes. The back-office records all showed “verification passed.” The incident was initially determined to be an individual case, and there were no systemic security flaws. The evidence chains between the two sides conflicted with each other. The incident sparked extensive discussions in the Chinese crypto community and prompted some users to withdraw money from Gate. Regarding the further development of the incident and some questions and details, Foresight News has sought evidence from both parties. Gate said it has actively communicated with the user and is unable to respond until the final investigation of the incident is completed. The other party had no response as of press time. The evidence is more specific, and the first version of the timeline published by Gate says that on July 4, a “new device” initiated a password and security reset request, and the reset was completed after live face verification (that is, requiring real-time detection of face movements to distinguish real people from photos, videos, or forged images), SMS verification codes, and email verification codes; on July 5, the account completed the unbinding of the phone with a section of the payment screen for Alipay's C2C orders in 2019; July 6. On the 7th, the account was logged in to the Mac website on an “old historical device”; on the same day, the account initiated a withdrawal to a new address. The withdrawal was released separately after full verification of live face verification, Google verification code, and fund password. Afterwards, the new address was added to the unverified whitelist. The account completed a total of 5 withdrawals, totaling about 1.7 million US dollars. @jheioff immediately posted an article denying it one by one, saying that he had never done the above face verification, had not submitted any videos or screen recordings, and had not applied to unbind his phone or change his email address. The controversy did not stop at this round of saying their own words. On the evening of July 8, Gate gave a second round of responses, adding quite specific details: face recognition at 19:44 (UTC+8) on July 4, the corresponding IP was 42.200.39.1XX, the device was iPhone 14. The live test results showed “low risk of inactivity” and was “highly consistent” with the KYC archived face; at around 3 a.m. on July 5, the account party also submitted a video of myself holding a document with a handwritten document for unbinding verification; on the same day, 21 On the recording screen of the 2019 Alipay C2C order submitted at 26 o'clock, Gate stated that it had cross-checked with its own transaction records. The details were multiple payment amounts at “22:28 on October 9, 2019.” @jheioff's second round of responses was also tit-for-point: she made it clear that she is currently using the iPhone 16 Pro. Her previous device was the iPhone 13, and neither were the iPhone 14 in the Gate records; at 3 a.m., she herself had already fallen asleep and was unable to submit a video with her ID; she was completely unaware of the 2019 Alipay recording. However, there were also few coincidences in this round of responses. She admits that when she logged in to the Mac website on July 7, it was probably her own browser because she usually used to hang exchange websites such as Gate in her browser. She immediately added that the login did not mean that she changed the email address, unbound the phone, reset the password, and finally made the withdrawal, and requested Gate to show 10 in the log...

43d agoForesight News#Gate #face recognition #Coin theft #hacks
Web3 Survival Manual 01 | What's the difference between private key/mnemonic words and wallet passwords?

Web3 Survival Manual 01 | What's the difference between private key/mnemonic words and wallet passwords?

If you forget your wallet password, you won't necessarily lose your coins; once the mnemonic words are leaked, it's really dangerous. Author: Tyler Tyler usually answers questions to some friends who are new to Web3, and has also encountered all kinds of problems. For example, some people ask, “Can I recover my wallet if I mistakenly deleted/forgot my password?”; there are also people who keep screenshots of mnemonic words in an album and think it doesn't matter if you don't send them to others; there are also people who haven't been able to tell the difference between a trading platform account and a wallet they've downloaded themselves. These questions seem basic, but in reality, many people who have used wallets for a few years don't necessarily really understand them. Therefore, I'm planning to launch a new “Web3 Survival Handbook” series to try not to use dark words, and focus on issues that seem small but are actually really important to help everyone understand and use Web3 step by step. This article is the first part of the “Web3 Survival Handbook”. Let's start with the most important things: private keys, mnemonics, and wallet passwords. What's the difference? 1. Remember one sentence: There are actually no coins in the wallet. Many people think that their BTC, USDT, ETH, or other tokens “exist in the wallet.” Strictly speaking, however, the assets are not in the wallet app, but are recorded on the blockchain. In other words, the wallet you use, whether it's MetaMask, OKX, SafePal, TP, or imToken, is more like a set of tools to help you keep your keys, rather than a safe for storing assets: the blockchain records how many assets an address has, and where those assets have been transferred; the wallet is responsible for helping you keep the “key” to this address and help you complete the transfer of assets to and from this address; for example, when you transfer, exchange tokens, or authorize an on-chain application, the wallet will call The private key stored internally signs this operation, which is equivalent to proving to the blockchain that the person controlling this address actually agreed to perform this operation. Therefore, the wallet app is not a safe with coins; rather, it is more like a box containing keys — what is really valuable is the key (private key) inside rather than the box itself. This also explains two things that many people don't understand: even if the original wallet app goes out of business, is removed, or accidentally deleted, as long as you back up the correct private key, you can download another wallet, re-import the private key and restore it, because currently the industry is based on the same set of technical standards, and the import logic of each wallet is interoperable. If you put the same key in a different box, the lock can still be opened; if the private key is taken by someone else, even if the phone is still in your hands and the wallet app is not deleted, others can still transfer your assets — because others can import this key into their own wallet However, blockchain only recognizes the key, and who doesn't recognize the key; 2. What is the difference between private keys, mnemonic words, and wallet passwords? Since private keys are so important, what are mnemonic words? In fact, mnemonic words appeared mainly to make it easier for ordinary people to back up their wallets. Because the private key is a string of characters randomly generated by the system, and it is long and messy, manual backup is easy to miscopy, and it is almost impossible for ordinary people to directly remember it. Therefore, the industry has adopted a common set of standards to “convert” all private keys into mnemonic words composed of 12 or 24 English words. In other words, the private key and the mnemonic are essentially the same key, only in a different format. Extend it a bit: theoretically speaking, a set of mnemonic words can derive multiple private keys. For ease of understanding, you can think of a private key as a specific key, and mnemonic words are more like a total backup of a keychain (I also talked about why mnemonics are usually generated from a fixed set of cryptographic assets, and the basic logic behind them; interested friends can take a look again). Most mainstream wallets now allow users to back up mnemonic words when created, and ordinary users are rarely directly required to copy a long list of private keys. However, you can't tell anyone, whether it's the private key or the mnemonic phrase. Under normal circumstances, neither wallet customer service, project party, or trading platform staff will ask you to send him your private key/mnemonic phrase. Anyone who asks you to provide a private key on the grounds of “verifying the wallet,” “removing risk control,” “receiving airdrops,” or “helping to recover assets” can basically be handled directly as a fraud. So what's the wallet password? The wallet password, that is, the PIN code or unlock password set when the app is opened, is only used to unlock the app itself. Similar to a mobile phone screen lock, it's not the same thing as a private key or mnemonic. Everyone can remember one...

60d agoTyler#mnemonic #security

StepFun (StepFun) will submit a Hong Kong stock IPO application as soon as Monday, with a valuation of 12 billion US dollars

Comparative news. According to surveillance, the Wall Street Journal quoted people familiar with the matter, Chinese artificial intelligence startup StepFun (StepFun) will submit a Hong Kong stock IPO application as soon as Monday. Major investors have proposed that Step Star's IPO valuation be as high as $12 billion, but the final valuation is still subject to change. Prior to Step Star, rivals Smart Spectrum AI and MiniMax were listed in Hong Kong in January of this year. Both companies' stock prices rose sharply after listing, which is expected to bring considerable returns to early investors before the ban expires next month. Recently, both Smart Spectrum AI and MiniMax said they are preparing to go public in the mainland market. Another big Chinese model startup, Dark Side of the Moon, is also preparing to go public in Hong Kong. Intensive listings reflect the urgent need for Chinese artificial intelligence companies to attract investors when the market environment is favorable. Over the past year, Hong Kong has once again become one of the most active initial public offering markets in the world, mainly thanks to a large number of Chinese companies from the fields of artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and biotechnology choosing to go public in Hong Kong. Step Star was founded in 2023. Founder and CEO Jiang Daxin was the former vice president of Microsoft. At the beginning of this year, Step Star hired Yin Qi, the co-founder of face recognition company Kuangshi Technology, as the chairman.

75d ago
Why did the five giants collectively go out of business within a week to open bank accounts for AI?

Why did the five giants collectively go out of business within a week to open bank accounts for AI?

Author: David, Shenchao TechFlow Original title: This week, everyone is helping AI open bank accounts. On March 18, another blockchain mainline was launched. It's called Tempo, and Stripe and Paradigm are behind it. Stripe, one of the world's largest online payments companies, handled $1.9 trillion in transactions last year; Paradigm is one of the biggest ventures in the crypto industry. The two companies teamed up to invest $500 million in Tempo last year, and the project is estimated at $5 billion. The $5 billion blockchain doesn't trade coins, doesn't do DeFi, and doesn't send memes. On the day the main network went live, Tempo's highest-profile product was: Let the machine pay for the machine. This sounds a bit abstract; you can understand that AI is now costing money every step of the way. It costs money to change the API once, it costs money to buy a piece of computing power, and it costs money to pull a batch of data from a database... But all existing payment systems are designed for people. Bank accounts require ID cards, credit cards require face recognition, and Alipay requires a mobile phone verification code. AI alone can't beat it. It can help you complete the entire workflow, but when you get to the point where you pay, you have to stop and wait for a human to click “confirm.” As a result, an open protocol called MPP (Machine Payments Protocol) was launched along with the mainnet, co-authored by Stripe. Simply put, it sets a set of rules for transactions between machines, including how to request payment, how to authorize, and how to settle. The expected scenario is that AI can independently spend money within a pre-set amount, and there is no need to find a human signature for every transaction. On the day of launch, more than 100 service providers, including OpenAI, Anthropic, and Shopify, were connected. But Tempo isn't the only one doing this week. Within five days, Visa set up a new division to release AI payment tools, Coinbase's payment agreement underwent a major upgrade, Mastercard spent $1.8 billion to acquire a stablecoin company, and Sam Altman's World released a toolkit dedicated to AI authentication. Five giants crammed into the same door for a week, rushing to open bank accounts for AI. Two paths, the same door Tempo does to help AI make payments. However, settlement is only one part of the payment system. To truly spend money independently, an AI agent also needs payment tools, funding channels, and identity authentication. Here, traditional payment companies and crypto companies are using their own specialty methods to grab the cake. On March 18, the same day that Tempo's main network went live, payment giant Visa also moved. The newly formed Crypto Labs division has released its first product: Visa CLI, a tool that allows AI agents to initiate credit card payments directly from the terminal. There is no need for an API key, and there is no need to register in advance. If AI needs to buy any service while running a task, you can pay by pressing a single command. Visa calls this “command-line commerce.” Visa's global card network is connected to billions of cards and tens of millions of merchants. If AI payments can run on this ready-made network, it doesn't need to wait for any new infrastructure to mature. Visa is an extension of the old path. Its opponent, Mastercard, chose another option: buy the road directly. On March 17, Mastercard announced a $1.8 billion acquisition of London stablecoin infrastructure company BVNK. This is the biggest stablecoin acquisition in the crypto industry's history. The purpose of this acquisition is also very straightforward. If the money paid by AI has to go through stablecoins, then stablecoins will go through my channel. On the side of cryptographic native companies, the action is just as intense. Coinbase's x402 protocol has undergone a major upgrade, expanding the scope of payments from several stablecoins to all ERC-20 tokens, and also released an MCP toolkit. Developers can connect AI tools to the payment network with one click. The two sides seem to have different starting points, but they are doing things in the same direction: traditional payment companies are embracing crypto, and crypto companies are embracing AI. Ultimately, crypto infrastructure is becoming the underlying conduit for AI payments. There's one more step left. AI can spend money, but how do merchants know if anyone is responsible for the AI that spent the money? On March 17, Sam Altman co-founded Worl...

156d agoburnking#AI #Tempo #main network #banks
How can cryptographic privacy be a key barrier to defending user freedom?

How can cryptographic privacy be a key barrier to defending user freedom?

Author: blocmates. Compilation: Shenchao TechFlow Original title: In the crypto world, betting on privacy means betting on freedom If history can be used as a reference, freedom will always find a way to win. And in this field, betting on privacy is, at the end of the day, betting on freedom. hey! I'm telling you, if you have ZachXBT-level on-chain investigation capabilities (plus a little patience), crypto transactions can be traced — but you already knew that, didn't you? Today, we can find out if your 78-year-old grandmother emptied your wallet or if North Korea-linked hacker groups are threatening every agreement. Yes, these so-called “bad” cases do exist, but they only appeared because on-chain activity was publicly visible to everyone. Surprised or not? The public chain ledger is indeed public. Cryptography and privacy may not be understood by today's young people, but those veteran players (Uncs) know that Bitcoin and the entire cryptocurrency journey today began with the cypherpunks' vision of building an open society based on privacy. It was this idea that gave birth to David Chaum's private digital currency Digicash (based on blind signature technology), and B-money, an anonymous decentralized payment system proposed by Wei Dai (sounds like a rapper's name, right). Satoshi Nakamoto went one step further and embedded a degree of privacy protection into a completely transparent ledger. Bitcoin's design relies on fake addresses and cryptographic hashes rather than real names or identities, creating the illusion of anonymity. However, this illusion of anonymity did not last long. With the rise of smart contracts, attention gradually shifted from privacy to on-chain programmability. Today, as the popularity of cryptocurrencies accelerates again, we're back where it all began — the first principle of privacy. In the field of encryption, privacy is becoming an important topic. Its scope extends beyond sending and receiving funds on the public chain to the privacy protection of on-chain applications. In today's article, we'll explore what privacy means in the field of cryptography, its various aspects, products built around privacy, points to focus on, and our thoughts on the future of cryptographic privacy. Fasten your seatbelts and get ready to go! What exactly does privacy mean in cryptocurrencies? The best way to understand privacy is through the perspective of traditional finance (TradFi). In traditional finance, the meaning of privacy is simple: personal data is protected, not disclosed to the public, and only visible to authorized entities. This includes the user's personal information such as biometric data, transaction history, account balance, etc. When we introduced this concept to the field of cryptography, the core of privacy was the protection of personal data in on-chain transactions. True privacy means that only users themselves or designated recipients, as authorized entities, can view or understand their own data. In the field of encryption, people often confuse privacy with anonymity. Although the culture of anonymity stems from the concept of privacy, there are technical differences between the two. For example, privacy focuses on hiding the details of a transaction, such as the transaction amount from one person to another, the counterparty, and other information; while anonymity is more concerned with hiding the identity of the user in the transaction. An example of a clear distinction between privacy and anonymity is Zcash and Monero. The former mainly relies on encryption technology and uses zk-SNARKS (zero-knowledge, simple, non-interactive knowledge verification) to hide transaction amounts; the latter uses hidden addresses and ring signature technology to fake and anonymize user identities. However, for the purposes of this article's discussion, we are considering privacy as an overall phenomenon that includes anonymity. Why is privacy an important topic in the field of encryption? As mentioned earlier, the foundation of the crypto industry stems from the cryptopunk spirit, which pursues privacy and decentralization to achieve freedom from national-level control. However, as private surveillance companies rapidly expand and show strong influence in the financial sector, as well as concerns about data misuse brought about by AI technology, alarm bells are sounding louder than ever before. Without privacy, data on the blockchain may reveal information such as users' spending habits, wealth distribution, political donations, and counterparty relationships. If this data falls into the wrong hands, it can be used for extreme control or exploitation. Another reason why privacy is critical in the field of encryption is that cryptocurrencies cannot truly be censorship-resistant without the support of privacy technology. Privacy protects individuals and organizations from coercion, enabling truly permissionless participation in the on-chain financial system. Furthermore, privacy also ensures that users are in real life...

298d agoburnking#privacy

Abstract and Modhaus reached a strategic partnership to support the interactive experience of fans on the chain

Comparatively, consumer-grade blockchain Abstract announced today that it has reached a strategic partnership with Korean entertainment company Modhaus. Modhaus is the team behind K-pop girl groups TriPles, ARTMS, and idntt. This collaboration will move Modhaus's fan interaction platform Cosmo to the Abstract Chain to allow fans to log in with one click through email, fingerprint, or face recognition, and participate seamlessly in the interaction without understanding complicated encryption processes.

411d ago