Balancer · 813
Take a deep dive into stablecoin cards: replacing Visa, or just a form of self-indulgence?

Take a deep dive into stablecoin cards: replacing Visa, or just a form of self-indulgence?

Author: Vaidik Mandloi Compiled and edited by: BitPushNews Crypto card spending surpassed $759 million in July, covering 9 million purchases — almost two and a half times that of the same period last year. However, more than 90% of the transaction volume still runs on the Visa network. And each of these cards will tell you the same story: we put payments on the stablecoin track, cut off the card network fees, and return the savings to the merchant. This is the same idea we discussed earlier when discussing how Stripe can build its own stablecoin cross-border payment chain. So if we actually try to get rid of the card network, what exactly will happen? Can avoiding Visa or Mastercard really save merchants money? Which layer do stablecoins replace in the payment stack? After thorough research, the answers were completely unexpected to me. To answer these questions about how the payment stack works, we must first figure out where the money actually goes when someone swipes a credit card. The first thing I realized was that most people, including those in the cryptocurrency industry, thought card networks like Visa had taken the biggest chunk. Wrong! When a merchant accepts a $100 purchase made with your rewards credit card, they pay the so-called Merchant Discount Rate (Merchant Discount Rate), which is approximately 2.2%, or $2.20. But the interesting thing is: this $2.20 didn't go into Visa's pocket; instead, it was distributed to three different participants, and the distribution ratio was very uneven. The largest chunk, about $1.75, went to the issuing bank (Credit Bank), which is the bank that issues credit cards to consumers. This fee is known as an interchange fee (Interchange), and it accounts for 70-80% of the entire merchant's processing fee. Next, the merchant's payment processor, also known as the acquirer (Acquirer), took about $0.30 to $0.70 as its markup. Finally, there is Visa or Mastercard, a real card network that everyone in the cryptocurrency industry wants to disrupt. It only takes an assessment fee (Assessment Fee) of about 0.13 to 0.18 dollars. This is only about 7-9% of the total cost paid by the merchant. So if you remove Visa from this equation, you're just removing the smallest item in the entire stack, and there's a reason why Visa's fees are so low. You see, Visa doesn't lend money to anyone, so it doesn't have to deal with all credit risk, chargebacks, or fraud disputes. In fact, Visa doesn't even transfer money. It's just a messaging network (Messaging Network) that only activates when you swipe in a store. Visa's job is to send authorization information from the merchant terminal to the card issuer and then back, and it establishes operating conditions that everyone in the system must abide by. However, it is the card issuer that actually takes on most of the heavy lifting. It is the card issuer that provides credit to the consumer and assumes the risk that the consumer may never repay. The card issuer is also responsible for floating funds (Float) between the purchase of the product and the date of payment of the bill, and uses exchange fees to fund reward programs that entice consumers to use the card. That's why Visa's business model is so fascinating. In 2025, Visa processed $14.2 trillion in payments, covering 257.5 billion transactions, generating net revenue of $40 billion and a net profit margin of nearly 50%. It earns an average of around 0.13 cents per transaction, which is its entire business model. Visa is one of the most valuable companies on the planet not because it charges a high fee per card, but because it processes a quarter of a trillion transactions a year, with almost zero marginal costs and zero credit risk. Now let's talk about the part where the situation is starting to make stablecoin cards really uncomfortable. The harsh reality of the stablecoin card economy Every stablecoin card is a debit card product. The money was already in the user's wallet in the form of USDC or USDT before the purchase occurred. Also, there is no floating deposit (Float) and no revolving balance (Revolving Balance) to generate interest income on the side. This puts these cards in a completely different economic category. Also, in 2010, the US Congress passed the “Durbin Amendment” (Durbin Amendment) to transfer debit card exchange fees to banks with assets over $10 billion...

11d agoWendy#VISA #pays #stablecoins

Cursor Auto Pick Model: Satisfaction close to Fable, 60% lower cost

In comparison, according to monitoring, Cursor launched Cursor Router, which automatically selects programming models for Teams and Enterprise. It will first determine the type and difficulty of the task, and then decide whether to call the cheap model or the cutting-edge model. The router was trained with over 600,000 real requests and tested on millions of requests. Auto Intelligence's user satisfaction rate is close to Fable, and the cost is about 60% lower. Auto Balance's satisfaction rate is higher than Opus 4.8, and the cost is about 36% lower. Cursor doesn't publish the full model pool, nor does it show by default which model is called each time. Officials only confirm that the router will allocate models according to task types, such as handing over interface design to models that are better at vision, and handing over complex and lengthy tasks to models with stronger reasoning abilities.

30d ago

Balance Coin, an algorithmic stablecoin, was attacked by oracles and plummeted 99%

Comparative news, according to CoinDesk reports, the algorithmic stablecoin Balance Coin was attacked on Wednesday due to an agreement pricing bug. The price plummeted from an anchor value close to $1 to about $0.0014, a drop of more than 99%, and the nominal market value almost evaporated by $3.5 million. Security company SlowMist revealed that the attackers manipulated the protocol oracles to write abnormally low Bitcoin prices into the system, and that the loan contract was not verified within a reasonable range and there was no settlement delay mechanism, so that the attackers could instantly liquidate the Bitcoin pledge bank that should not have been liquidated in a single transaction and exchange profit. The actual net profit was about 912,000 US dollars, and the funds came from the governing entity 42DAO. The attack comes at a time when DeFi security is facing stricter scrutiny due to the increased capabilities of AI systems. Last night, the OpenAI test model broke through its own test environment and hacked the Hugging Face server in a controlled evaluation, highlighting the real threat posed by the upgrade of automated attack methods to the on-chain protocol.

31d ago#On-chain dynamics

42DAO's GemJoin was attacked on BSC, losing around $900,000

In comparison, according to a security alert issued by TenArmor, an on-chain security monitoring agency, on July 22, its system detected a suspicious attack involving GemJoin, a subsidiary of 42DAO (@42dao_official), which occurred on BNB Smart Chain (BSC), causing a loss of approximately $900,000. On-chain transaction records show that the attackers withdrew about 10.73 Binance-Peg BTCB (worth about $715,000) through the GemJoin contract and carried out token exchange operations through PancakeSwap, involving assets such as BALANCE COIN (BLC) and Binance-Peg BSC-USD.

31d ago#On-chain dynamics

Balance Coin fell more than 99%, and 42DAO is suspected to have been attacked by $915,000

Comparing news, the algorithmic stablecoin Balance Coin fell from $0.9954 to $0.001358, a drop of more than 99%. This stablecoin is Balance Protocol's native algorithm stablecoin, and the design goal is to maintain a bond with the US dollar. Blockchain security firm PeckShield said the unanchoring occurred after 42DAO, the decentralized autonomous organization that governs Balance Protocol and its BLC token, was attacked by a $915,000 vulnerability. TenArmor said it detected suspicious attacks involving GemJoin and 42DAO on BNB Chain.

31d ago
Strategy's accounting trick: the upper limit of coin sales is far more than $1.25 billion

Strategy's accounting trick: the upper limit of coin sales is far more than $1.25 billion

Author: Bankless Compiled by: Azuma Original title: Strategy's Accounting Trick: The maximum selling price is far more than $1.25 billion Strategy revealed on July 7 that the company has sold 3,588 BTC between June 29 and July 5, worth about $216 million. The funds were used to pay STRC's dividends and supplement the USD Reserve (USD Reserve) previously used to pay dividends. Despite completing this sale, Strategy said its full $1.25 billion reserve-building capacity (reserve-building capacity) is still in effect. Daily note: In the “Self-Rescue Plan” announced last week, Strategy stated that it has authorized the company to sell BTC and build up a reserve of up to $1.25 billion. In other words, the $216 million BTC sold by Strategy to replenish reserves did not count against previously disclosed reserve construction amounts. Strictly speaking, there is a technical difference between the two: one is “replenishing reserves” (replenishing reserves) and the other is “building” (building). However, in reality, both types of sales will eventually flow into the same reserve pool for the same purpose, but are classified as different uses. Looking at it another way, the “BTC Monetization Program” (BTC Monetization Program) previously disclosed by BTC never limited Strategy to sell a total of $1.25 billion in Bitcoin; it limited only one pool of funds — that is, “building” dollar reserves by selling BTC. The plan also allows Strategy to sell BTC for other purposes, and this is exactly what we're seeing right now. Three funding pools On June 29, after weeks of pressure from MSTR and STRC, Strategy launched the BTC “monetization plan” as part of its larger “Digital Credit Capital Framework” (Digital Credit Capital Framework). The plan allows Strategy to sell Bitcoin, and actually mentions three main uses: one is to build the reserve (Build the reserve), which can sell up to $1.25 billion in BTC to establish a USD Reserve (USD Reserve); the other is to pay the cost of preferred shares and debt (Cover the preferreds), that is, selling BTC to pay Strategy's fixed dividends and interest obligations on its preferred shares and debts. If management believes “selling BTC is more profitable than issuing common shares,” it can also supplement reserves previously used to pay for these obligations by selling BTC. The third is fund buybacks (fund buybacks), that is, selling BTC to buy back up to $1 billion of preferred shares (preferred shares) and up to $1 billion of MSTR common stock (common stock). Additionally, the proceeds from the sale of BTC may also be used to cover related taxes, processing fees, and other charges. At the time, discussions across the market focused on the first pool of funds of $1.25 billion, but that was far from the case. Looking at the third pool alone, the sales amount was actually increased by an additional 2 billion US dollars. Therefore, when calculating only the portion with a clear upper limit, the BTC coin sales scale currently designed by Strategy has exceeded 3 billion US dollars, and this does not include the pool used to pay dividends, interest, and supplementary reserves — this section does not currently disclose any clear upper limit. This is where building (building) and supplementing (replenishing) is really delicate. The purpose of the USD Reserve (USD Reserve) is to pay dividends and debt interest obligations on these preferred shares. Under the current policy framework, it cannot be used for share repurchases. As of June 28, Strategy's dollar reserves were US$2.55 billion, which is sufficient to cover the company's annual debt and preferred share payment obligations of approximately US$1.76 billion, which is equivalent to a 17-month guarantee period. Strategy's board of directors set the minimum...

43d agoburnking#Strategy #Bitcoin

Aztec Network was attacked and lost more than $2.15 million due to a mismatch between ZK proof and L1 settlement boundaries

According to an analysis by BlockSec Phalcon (@Phalcon_xyz), Aztec Network's RollupProcessorV3 contract was attacked, causing losses of over $2.15 million. The root cause is that NumRealTxS is not effectively bound to the set of transactions enforced by the ZK certificate, causing the proof verification path to deviate from the L1 settlement logic's interpretation of the transaction list. Attackers use this vulnerability to move actual deposits to slots that are not processed by settlement logic, bypass the depositBalance function, create an unsecured private balance out of thin air, and then extract it through the normal settlement process. A total of seven types of assets are involved.

68d ago
CYBERNEWS: “BALANCE” |0609America

CYBERNEWS: “BALANCE” |0609America

After the agricultural sector, in particular after the fixed interest rate hike, liquidity depletion, and several deterministic macro indices with high interest rates, the big cake withstood small level of alarm for only a few hours. After that, it was driven by the enthusiasm of some cutting-edge technology sectors as a whole, and even progressed rapidly in an independent market, with an amplitude of more than three points. Unstoppable, unstoppable. In 24 hours, the transaction amount decreased by 17%, and the total amount of closed positions was halved. The total amount of options holdings increased 3.7 times. The greed and fear index is still 9. The probability of being killed under the same... daily ranking policy as yesterday is increasing, and risks are piling up. Currently, there are no major differences between long and empty, and everyone is on the same page. However, the solar form has a situation where death is accelerated, and it is possible that when Iri cannot bear loneliness, it is time to lower the needle.

74d agoWendy#Blue Chain Think Tank

Token of Power was attacked and approximately $1.85 million was lost

In comparison, according to Cyvers Alerts monitoring, Token of Power was hacked and approximately $1.85 million was lost. A malicious transaction was executed through the Tornado Cash funding address to transfer funds from Balancer V1's TOP/WETH liquidity pool. The stolen assets were then transferred again to Tornado Cash for coin mixing.

74d ago

Strive plans to increase ASST and SATA ATM financing by $2.1 billion each

Comparing news, Strive CEO Matt Cole said that the company expects to increase the size of the ASST and SATA ATM (At-The-Market, issued at market price) financing plans by $2.1 billion each to reflect the market's continued growing liquidity and investment demand for the two securities. Cole said that the relevant adjustments indicate that investors' interest in ASST and SATA continues to grow, and the company plans to release the latest balance sheet (Balance Sheet) update before the US stock market tomorrow to reveal more financial and capital allocations. The ATM financing mechanism allows listed companies to gradually sell newly issued shares during market transactions to improve financing flexibility and raise capital dynamically according to market demand. This article is sponsored by GENG, Build Your Fortune on GENG (https://geng.one)

82d agoburnking